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Abstract Unemployment protection systems have certain characteristics in com-
mon in Argentina, Uruguay, Spain and Italy: they are compulsory and contributory- 
proportional, although in Uruguay, it also has a capitalisation supplement. Despite 
the similarities, they work differently because the context of informal employment 
chiefly, and unemployment, low salaries and precariousness differ greatly. 
Consequently, the unemployment protection coverage rate varies. Theories of the 
Active Welfare State, the Investor State and the reforms of unemployment protec-
tion systems have led to a certain modernising language being adopted in these 
countries: activation, employability, conditionality, lifelong learning, flexibility, 
which are, among others, words shared with Europe.
However, the meanings of these words differ according to the institutional con-
text of each country. In Latin America the welfare state is low institutionalised even 
almost non-existent, while in Europe it is a diverse institution. Despite this, the four 
countries share an upward trend in benefit policies, in accordance with the increase 
in poverty risk.
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13.1  Introduction
Unemployment is major source of income insecurity and inequality. This can be 
important in times of economic downturn (Pfeifer 2012). On the contrary, contribu-
tory unemployment protection systems have been one of the great social achieve-
ments to cushion the effects of the economic cycle on employment. Public opinion 
surveys from different European and Latin American countries coincide on the 
importance of matters related to employment and the social protection of same 
(Chebez 2007). This author observes that employment is one of the fundamental 
pillars in the structure of social order, its legitimacy and access to social rights. 
Consequently, unemployment is a threat to the legitimacy of social order. Therefrom 
the crucial importance of institutionalising matters linked to employment and unem-
ployment. However, one of the differences between Europe and Latin American lies 
in the degree of institutionalisation of matters related to employment and the protec-
tion of the unemployed.
Contributory unemployment protection systems differ from non-contributory 
ones, because these latter ones are of a welfare nature to combat severe poverty 
(Amarante and Bucheli 2006). Throughout the twentieth century, social protection 
systems developed in Europe, and at a weaker rate in the majority of Latin American 
countries, as the historical result of social conflicts to reduce and correct the social 
inequalities generated by the labour market. Today these social protection institu-
tions are undergoing a reform process.
At present, the academic and social interest in compared social protection poli-
cies is linked to the growth in inequalities after the Great Recession in the United 
States and Europe between 2008 and 2015. Inequalities and the poverty risk have 
risen in countries from the European Union and in some countries from Latin 
America. Social inclusion and income security are on the political agenda of both 
hemispheres today. The reason behind this chapter is the fact that unemployment 
protection in Europe is associated with the active inclusion policy. The guarantee of 
families’ economic income is crucial in the context of long-term unemployment and 
the consequent poverty risk (Classen and Clegg 2012). In Europe, social protection 
systems are being reformed with a view to associating passive social policies with 
active employment policies, inspired by the Active Welfare State theory (Boyer 
2005; Cassier et al. 2005; Fernández and Serrano 2014).
Without a doubt, the unemployment protection debate is also acquiring increas-
ing political importance in Europe as a result of the plan to establish a protection 
system for supranational unemployment, in the European sphere (Dullien et  al. 
2017). Initially, it is a concept of social protection as a mechanism to cushion the 
economic cycle and to cooperate with member states. On the contrary, according to 
Filgueira (2015), institutions from the “social-democratic” welfare state are almost 
non-existent in Latin America, because historically none of the variables that pro-
moted it in Europe have occurred there, although in River Plate countries it is more 
important.
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This chapter has two goals: the first is to conduct a comparative analysis of the 
compulsory and contributory unemployment protection systems in four countries 
(Spain, Italy, Argentina and Uruguay) participating in the INCASI project: What are 
their similarities and differences?; the second aim is to analyse the trends in the 
reforms of the unemployment benefit systems. To do so we ask: Despite the differ-
ences between countries, are there common trends in the reform policy?
Italy and Spain were selected because they are two countries from the south of 
Europe which share a series of problems, such as high unemployment, long-term 
unemployment for certain groups, precarious employment especially among youths, 
low salaries, a fragmented and weak social protection system, and a contributory- 
proportional unemployment protection model (Del Pino and Ramos 2013), as well 
as a “familarist” welfare state (Moreno 2007; Baglioni and Oliveira 2013). These 
two countries are part of the coordinated economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), which 
means the state plays a considerable role and social actors participate in the social 
macro-economic dialogue, as we saw in Chap. 2.
Argentina and Uruguay have been selected for the comparison because they are 
included in the so-called “structural heterogeneity” model of peripheral capitalism 
(Presbich 1981; Ricupero 2004) or “economies with hierarchical labour markets” 
(Schneider 2009). Both countries have very weak unemployment protection, a high 
volume of informal employment, a bi-monetised economy and a subsistence econ-
omy (Cecchini and Martínez 2011). Therefore, the labour market is more segmented 
than in Italy and Spain. But despite the institutional differences, these Latin 
American countries appear to share certain similarities with Spain and Italy, such as 
the existence of compulsory, contributory and proportional unemployment benefit 
and the existence of informal employment, although with different volumes and 
degrees of fiscal discipline.
Our theory is that similarities in the unemployment benefit systems are apparent, 
but in actual fact they operate differently. In other words, relatively similar institu-
tions work in very different ways when the context changes. In the four countries, 
the language of liberal modernisation has led to the use of specific concepts linked 
to the activation policy. Social models are historical legacies and are associated with 
the economic and political processes of the region. Italy and Spain are protected by 
the European Social Model, by the neo-corporatist tradition, a system of regularised 
labour relations, with effective unions and coordinated economies (Scharpf 2000; 
Hall and Soskice 2001). While in Argentina and Uruguay the neo-corporatist struc-
tures are very weak and are conditioned by the structural heterogeneity characteris-
ing the region. In other words, a type of peripheral capitalism dependent on the 
central economies, but with a dual nature in which economic experiences similar to 
the developed world coexist alongside others which do not even manage to resolve 
the struggle between them, demonstrating strong productive heterogeneities depend-
ing on the size of the company (Presbich 1981; Schneider 2009; Ricupero 2004). 
Despite the differences, there are certain similar trends in the discourses about the 
reforms of unemployment protection benefits, such as the “formal discursive” link 
between active and passive policies (in actual fact, non-existent), the demand for 
conditionality regarding unemployment benefit and the increase in welfarism.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. (1) In the first we have seen the intro-
duction. (2) In the second section a more general section which frames the debate, 
we do a brief theoretical conceptualisation of the concept of unemployment bene-
fits, as well as a review of the comparative models of unemployment protection and 
their functions, from which two hypotheses will be drawn. We will also analyse a 
classification of the models based on two dimensions: one, the pre-distributive 
dimension, which refers to variables such as the unemployment rate, the under- 
employment time due to a lack of work hours, and the informal employment rate; 
and the other, the post-distributive dimension, which refers to variables such as the 
rate of subsidies for people of working age, the salary replacement rate of the unem-
ployment benefits and the coverage rate of the unemployed workers. The analysis of 
the classification will reveal the similarities and dissimilarities between the models. 
(3) In the third more specific section, we will examine the specific characteristics of 
unemployment benefits in Spain, Italy, Argentina and Uruguay, which formally 
share the definition of contributory-proportional systems linked to formal employ-
ment. Here we will also analyse the emerging trends in the design and/or reform of 
unemployment protection systems. These trends are characterised by the use of a 
modernising language inspired by the neoliberal paradigm of activation and the 
conditionality of benefits. Lastly, (4) in the fourth section, we will draw some 
conclusions.
13.2  Models and Institutions of Unemployment Protection
13.2.1  Conceptualisation
The literature discusses unemployment benefits, which is a restrictive term because 
it refers to contributory systems and to the rights of the covered person. In general, 
the benefit systems follow the guideline stipulated in Recommendation number 1 
of the ILO, in 1919,1 in which governments were encouraged to “organise an effi-
cient system of unemployment benefits” (Topalov 2000). The causes usually stipu-
lated are involuntary job loss, temporary suspension of a contract and reduced 
hours due to the restructuring of companies (Amarante and Bucheli 2006). 
Furthermore, unemployment “protection” is discussed; this term has a broader 
connotation and includes non-contributory welfare benefits, aimed at long-term 
unemployed people who have lost the contributory right, to homes that have lost 
their incomes and to people at risk of poverty. Initially they were “rescue funds”, 
but from the 1940s onwards in Europe they began to be called “subsidies” on 
account of being linked to the Welfare State based on the Rule of Law with the 
1 In 1919, at the first International Labour Conference, there were only two countries with compul-
sory unemployment benefit: the United Kingdom and Italy (Chebez 2007: 3).
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Social Security Generalisation Law in 1946  in France, a fundamental milestone 
(see Castel 1997; Topalov 2000; Chebez 2007).
The unemployment benefit systems were brought into effect towards the begin-
ning of the twentieth century and they evolved throughout the century, inspired by 
the Bismarck model (Cecchini and Martínez 2011). These benefits were first imple-
mented in Europe and then in Latin America (Diez and Bucheli 2002) and they can 
be classified as a model of “segmented universalism” in the four countries. Despite 
their universalist vocation, in practice, they have protected salary earners, the mid-
dle classes and the organised sectors of the manual working class. The unemploy-
ment benefit programmes differ between countries according to the structure and 
level of benefits, duration of the benefits, requirements to obtain it, and financing 
and administration. In a considerable number of countries the programmes are 
anchored in the legislation. In many countries the unemployment benefit pro-
grammes are compulsory, in some they are voluntary and in others they are indi-
vidual, operating as a capitalisation savings system (Chile). In other cases (for 
example, in Uruguay) there is a supplementary payment of unemployment benefit 
via capitalisation (Cecchini and Martínez 2011). In a small number of countries 
there are additional welfare systems for those people who have exhausted the con-
tributory benefits.
The four countries (Spain, Italy, Argentina and Uruguay) have public, compul-
sory and contributory-proportional unemployment benefit systems. The unemploy-
ment protection programmes provide income support for a specific period of time 
for unemployed workers, in addition to guaranteed minimum income programmes; 
these programmes are important to guarantee income security to the unemployed 
and underemployed, workers and their families, thereby contributing towards pre-
venting poverty, at least in its most extreme form. Worldwide, only 38.6% of the 
labour force is covered by unemployment protection (ILO 2017), to a large extent 
as a result of the high levels of informal employment and the lack of unemployment 
protection.
13.2.1.1  Functions of Unemployment Benefit Systems
The programme offers a transitory benefit which essentially seeks to: relieve the 
loss of income and provide a possibility of returning to the work force; cushion the 
decline in additional expenditure during recessions; contribute towards stabilising 
the economy, by supporting consumption; sustain professional activity, retain the 
skilled work force in the labour market; reduce the risk of poverty and social con-
flict, as well as being a moral principle guaranteeing income to facilitate social 
cohesion (Esping-Andersen 2000; Palier 2010; Gómez and Buendía 2014). The 
unemployment benefit programmes are contributory and differ from welfare pro-
grammes in that these are non-contributory.
These social functions of the unemployment protection institution are today 
questioned and debated from the perspective of neoliberal policies. The hegemony 
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of the neoliberal paradigm has led to the argument that unemployment protection 
discourages the return to the labour market, and consequently, commitment must be 
encouraged with active job-seeking; and an employment creation policy should also 
be implemented with tax relief.
The increase in unemployment (see Table 13.1) and long-term unemployment 
(more than 2 years) has also influenced the debate about its reform, since the high 
volume of economies studied hinders the financing of unemployment bene-
fits hugely.
The heavy debt of states (Tables 13.2 and 13.3 in the Appendix) today contrib-
utes to the demand for reform policies of unemployment benefits. Many analysts 
state that passive policies would have to move towards active policies to encourage 
professional training and upskilling (Ciace 2009; Cnel 2014; Heidenreich and Rice 
2016) and, with this, transfer the responsibility to the individual (Fernández and 
Serrano 2014; Del Pino and Ramos 2013). However, this debate on the reforms of 
the social protection systems differs between countries. As a result, we must discuss 
the variety of unemployment protection systems, as observed by Chebez (2007).2 
Said author warned that Argentina still had a long way to go to “institutionalise a 
state policy that places employment at the centre of the social question and over-
come the economic and political resistances” (2006: 8). In other words, the persis-
tent problem is still the weakness of the institutionalisation of the unemployment 
protection system.
13.2.2  Analysis of the Compared Models
The specialised literature differentiates between three unemployment protection 
models in the western countries of the European Union: the social democratic 
Scandinavian model, the Bismarck model and the Mediterranean model (Esping- 
Andersen 2000; Pfeifer 2012; Burroni 2014). In addition, we can define a fourth 
model that is typical of the River Plate countries in South America (ILO 2018).
2 Chebez (2007) studied a comparison between Argentina and Spain and highlights that the total 
resources dedicated to the activation of unemployed people is only 13% in Argentina, and 33% 
in Spain.
Table 13.1 Compared unemployment rate (%)
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Italy 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9 11.7 11.2 10.4
Spain 8.5 8.2 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1 19.6 17.2 14.4
Argentina 10.9 9.0 8.2 8.7 8.0 7.4 7.1 7.6 7.4 6.8 8.1 9.0 9.6
Uruguay 10.7 9.3 8.0 7.7 7.1 6.3 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.5 7.8 6.9 8.4
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD (2019) and Eurostat (2019)
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13.2.2.1  Social-Democratic Scandinavian Model
The Scandinavian model (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland) is characterised 
by being a universalist protection model, with a long duration, and for the generos-
ity of the benefits for the unemployed. However, this model links these benefits to a 
condition (conditionality) for the unemployed person: they must undertake profes-
sional training and upskilling (Bambra and Eikemo 2009). An example of this is 
Denmark, which has introduced flexi-security (Burroni 2014), a long-term unem-
ployment benefit in exchange for training and accepting job offers (Kluve et  al. 
2007; Heidenreich and Rice 2016); apart from individuals aged less than 30 who 
must accept the training and job offers after 3 months of becoming unemployed. 
The monitoring and training of unemployed people is performed on an individual 
basis in order to provide them with guidance. These countries have high expenditure 
in training, mediation and policies with incentives for those aged over 45. The 
Scandinavian countries have a “relatively decommercialised” unemployment pro-
tection model (Esping-Andersen 2000; Ferrera 2013; Bonoli 2010). Said countries 
are part of the social democratic political tradition, with considerable participation 
from unions in social concertation.
13.2.2.2  Bismarck Protection Model
The unemployment protection system is contributory-proportional in Germany and 
the Netherlands, as well as in other Germanic countries. The benefits depend on the 
unemployed person’s previous contributions (Del Pino and Ramos 2013). In addi-
tion, there is an additional social system of transfers to families and subsidies for 
certain precarious jobs (youths’ mini-jobs), such as housing and transport subsidies.
In the case of Germany, unemployment benefit is also linked to dual professional 
training, which offers specialised training in companies, facilitating a swift transfer 
to the labour market. The unions have an active role in social concertation. In gen-
eral, we can deduce that rights and duties are closely interrelated in the goals to face 
unemployment.
13.2.2.3  Mediterranean Protection Model
The Mediterranean model (Spain and Italy), is also characterised by being a 
contributory- proportional system linked to employment, typical of neo-corporatist 
models (Guillén 2010). Social concertation, with the participation of unions and busi-
ness-owners, is important for the sustainability of the welfare system. These two 
countries have unstable labour markets, with economies based on small companies, a 
high level of temporary employment contracts, high job turnover and informal hiring. 
This all hinders young people’s and women’s access to the right to unemployment 
protection, due to the insufficient number of accumulated contributory days. In this 
context, the insufficiency of the contributory unemployment benefits is accompanied 
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by a welfare system of subsidies, transfers and supplementary minimum income 
(Martín Artiles et al. 2017). The result is a very fragmented unemployment protection 
(Bonoli 2010), which is why the European Union demands ending the fragmentation, 
standardising the unemployment protection system and linking political policies with 
active policies to encourage unemployed people and introduce conditionality clauses 
(Rodriguez Cabrero 2012; Gualmini and Rizza 2015).
13.2.2.4  Latin American Models of Unemployment Benefit
In the Latin American social model (Presbich 1981), market economies coexist with 
bi-monetised economies (national currency and American dollar) and subsistence 
economies. Unemployment protection is quite recent in Argentina. It began in 
1967 in the construction sector (Diez and Bucheli 2002). But a programme for the 
entire formal sector of the economy was not introduced until Law 24.013 of 1991 
when it was definitively implemented. The unemployment protection programme is 
financed with a contribution from the company (1.5% of the salary); the worker 
does not contribute, but the state incurs the deficits.
The institutional protection models of unemployment benefits revolve around 
protections that are similar to the Mediterranean model, but they present very par-
ticular limits, especially, in Argentina (Chebez 2007). The high lack of protection of 
informal employees limits the scope of the benefit, thereby limiting the capacity of 
contributory contribution to public coffers, which is an endemic problem in Latin 
American countries (Cecchini and Martínez 2011). Therefore, the contribution 
capacity is very restricted, the total number of unemployed people with unemploy-
ment benefits is low in Argentina (4.9%, ILO 2019), while in Uruguay it is moderate 
(27.9%).
In short, based on the above, we can consider two hypotheses.
The first hypothesis (H1) is that the benefit systems, despite having seemingly 
similar characteristics as contributory-proportional systems, operate differently due 
to the context of each country, and the informality of employment.
The second hypothesis (H2) is that—despite the institutional similarities and dif-
ferences in the four countries—the reforms tend to converge in a liberalism-inspired 
modernising language that follows certain disciplinary patterns.
13.2.3  Classification of Unemployment Protection Models
The following statistical analysis seeks to classify countries in a general framework 
according to the models and to contrast the two hypotheses. This analysis can be 
summarised in two dimensions. The first dimension refers to the pre-distributive 
institutions and the second to the post-distributive ones (Hacker 2011; Zalakain and 
Barragué 2017). Pre-distributive institutions refer to the labour market and highlight 
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the primary inequalities generated by employment, unemployment and infor-
mality in work. Post-distributive institutions refer to the institutions that correct 
the inequalities generated in the labour market, for example unemployment ben-
efit systems and subsidies implemented to reduce the poverty risk (Barragué 
2011, 2013).
Based on this distinction between the two dimensions, below we develop an 
analysis model to study a classification of six variables. On the one hand, for the 
analysis of pre-distributive indicators we take three variables: (1) the country’s 
unemployment rate; (2) the underemployment rate due to a lack of work hours and 
(3) the volume of informal employment. In short, these indicators demonstrate 
inequality, precariousness of employment and the demand for the transfer of con-
tributory unemployment benefits and subsidies.
Furthermore, for the analysis of social protection transfers we take another three 
variables: (1) the coverage rate of workers with unemployment protection benefit; 
(2) the rate of salary replacement represented by the unemployment benefit and (3) 
the proportion of the population of working age who receive subsidies to avoid 
poverty risk (see Table 13.4).
13.2.3.1  Analysis of Similarities and Differences
The cluster analysis shows the similarities and dissimilarities between the countries, 
expressed according to the closeness or distance between them, and the models in 
which they are registered. In Fig. 13.1 we present the dendrogram of the possible 
associations among standardised variables. Following the analysis of these associa-
tions we can observe four groups.
13.2.3.2  Cluster 1: Liberal and Latin-American Countries—Low 
Unemployment Protection
This first cluster shows the two Latin American countries being analysed: Chile, 
Argentina and Uruguay, which, alongside Brazil, are part of the model of econo-
mies with structural heterogeneity (Presbich 1981) or hierarchised labour markets 
(Schneider 2009). This cluster is characterised by having very high rates of precari-
ousness, underemployment, informal employment and unemployment. The low 
unemployment protection in Uruguay and Argentina seems to be essentially 
explained by four reasons: the high volume of informal work, because many of the 
unemployed individuals were previously self-employed, because they come from a 
period of inactivity and because many of them are long-term unemployed who have 
exhausted the coverage (Amarante and Bucheli 2006). This all leads to strong 
inequalities, as demonstrated by the pre and post-distributive Gini indices (see 
details in Chap. 2 and here average in Table 13.5). The countries from this cluster 
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show higher than average Gini indices. The average Gini labour index in 2018 was 
high and the post-distributive one was also high. In other words, the difference 
between both indicators highlights that the capacity for correction through post- 
distributive policies is limited.
13.2.3.3  Cluster 2: Germanic Area—High Unemployment Protection
This cluster contains the neo-corporatist countries, such as Austria, and Germany. 
These countries share high unemployment protection, subsidies and salary replace-
ment rates, underscoring their protection systems through their welfare states, clas-
sified as a Bismarck model (Esping-Andersen 2000; Menz 2008). Even here it is 
included UK. In this cluster the distances between the Gini labour index, pre-dis-
tributive and the post-distributive are reduced. Therefore, the capacity for correction 
through post-distributive policies is high.
Fig. 13.1 Cluster of countries and models. Dendrogram. Source: Own elaboration
A. Martín-Artiles et al.
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13.2.3.4  Cluster 3: Scandinavian Neocorporatist and Southern 
Bismarkian Countries
The third group contains two subgroups. In one hand, the Scandinavian countries, 
characterised by strong neocorporatist model. In other hand, Southern bismarkian 
contributive models, such France, Spain and Italy, whose main characteristics are an 
unemployment protection and subsidies rate that is close to the average; a salary 
replacement rate higher than the average of the 25 countries studied; and a high rate 
of salary replacement due to unemployment. Moreover, these countries have an 
unemployment level that is close to the average. Informal employment and under-
employment stand below the average. The inequalities in this cluster are relatively 
high, but thanks to the unemployment protection and subsidies, the distances 
between the pre-distributive labour Gini and the post-distributive Gini are reduced 
to the same extent as in Cluster 2.
13.2.3.5  Cluster 4: Eastern Countries Model
Finally, this cluster contains the post-communist countries: Hungary, Poland, 
Chequia, Slovenia, Slovaquia, Bulgaria, with low coverage of unemployment pro-
tection, low unemployment rate and intermediate inequalities in Gini Index.
13.2.4  Summary: Argentina and Uruguay Versus Spain 
and Italy
Figures 13.2 and 13.3 represent the differences between the four countries. On the 
one hand, Argentina and Uruguay display higher post-distributive Gini indices, that 
is, they reflect greater inequality and less unemployment protection. Therefore, in 
relation to the first hypothesis (H1) we can confirm that a high rate of informal 
employment weakens the protection system. In addition, the contributory capacity 
of business owners and workers is also weak. This is a structural problem that has 
continued for many years and does not reduce inequalities.
On the other hand, Spain and Italy have less inequality comparatively and greater 
unemployment protection. The context of a greater comparative volume of formal 
employment (H1) contributes to a certain capacity towards sustaining the benefit 
system. However, Spain and Italy have, although to a lesser extent than the Latin 
American countries analysed, a considerable volume of informal employment, 
long-term unemployment, precarious and temporary jobs, and low salaries, repre-
senting a potential threat to the maintenance of unemployment benefits. 
Hypothetically, this seems to be a point of convergence between the four countries 
mentioned, which we will explore if it applies in the analysis of the second hypoth-
esis (H2).
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According to the comparison between the semi-coordinated economy models 
(Spain and Italy) and the structural heterogeneity model (Argentina and Uruguay) 
we can observe the different unemployment benefit mechanisms and the trend of 
their reforms. Unemployment protection can adopt different forms and typically, 
they have been associated with the aim of cushioning the financial costs generated 
by losing one’s job. However, this approach is incomplete, since it does not include 
the reincorporation of the unemployed person into the workplace as the final stage 
of the protection process against the loss of the source of work. From this 
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perspective, job-seeking for the reincorporation of the unemployed person into the 
workplace acquires at least similar importance to the monetary compensation (Van 
Breugel 2014). In European countries, the response to this problem has consisted of 
the development of active and passive policies (Fernández and Serrano 2014), the 
association of unemployment benefits with the obligation to train, upskill and return 
to the labour market (Martín Artiles et al. 2017). In other words, associating the pas-
sive policies (benefits and subsidies) with the active employment policies (media-
tion, job-seeking and continuous training). In short, the new paradigm is the Active 
Welfare State, a type of welfare state with liberal and social traits (Boyer 2005).
13.3  Compared Unemployment Protection: Argentina, 
Uruguay, Spain and Italy
Following the general comparative perspective of models and their classification, 
set out in previous paragraphs, we now move on to specifically observing the unem-
ployment benefit systems in the four countries (see summarised Table 13.6). The 
unemployment benefit systems are compulsory, contributory and proportional in the 
four countries, but with notable differences. In Spain and Italy the company’s con-
tribution to the social security contributions is relatively high, in comparative terms. 
On the contrary, in Argentina and Uruguay it is very low.
The contribution from workers is relatively low in the four countries. The state 
finances the deficits in all of them. But, in addition, the state allocates resources 
from the national budget to the unemployment benefits of people who have 
exhausted the social benefits. In other words, there are two types of transfers: (1) 
contributory benefits for unemployment and (2) welfare subsidies for those people 
who have exhausted the coverage time of the contributory benefit or are at risk of 
severe poverty.
13.3.1  Unemployment Benefits in Argentina
In Argentina the unemployment benefit has been in force since the beginning of the 
1990s. It is contributory in nature (due to its financing scheme), and its role has 
diminished. In a segmented labour market with a high level of informal labour, only 
a low percentage of unemployed people meet the access requirements: they must 
have worked in the formal sector for at least 6 months in the 3 years prior to the 
termination of the professional relationship, with 1.5% of the employer’s contribu-
tion going to the National Employment Fund in Argentina. In other words, the con-
text of a high volume of informal employment limits the contributory income to the 
unemployment protection system, as we pointed out in the first hypothesis.
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Since the 1990s the Spanish model has had some influence on the unemployment 
protection systems in Argentina, according to Chebez (2007). This influences the 
use of certain “modernising concepts” (second hypothesis), such as “activation, 
conditionality, lifelong learning, availability, etc.” Said modernity does not neces-
sarily mean a strong institutionalisation of the unemployment benefit. Actually, it 
appears there is not sufficient union pressure to strengthen the benefit system in the 
private sector out of fear that the compensation might be a greater flexibilization of 
the labour market. The unions preferred to emphasise the payment of severance pay 
because it can be a considerable amount,3 which in many cases is used as a type of 
capitalisation to become self-employed or to relieve the period of unemployment.
The total benefit is a small proportion of the lost salary (approximately 120 dol-
lars per month), and as such, even for those entitled to receive the benefit, it is 
clearly insufficient. Thus, the function of the benefit as income support is limited. In 
certain cases it even leads to the self-exclusion of the beneficiary due to the low rate 
of salary replacement.4
The duration of the benefit is relatively short, up to 12 months (Argentina) and 
6 months (Uruguay). In Argentina there is “formally” a “conditionality” policy for 
active job-seeking and training. However, the means of monitoring and follow-up 
are very weak or non-existent, and as such, the modernisation is merely discursive. 
This is a problem in the Southern Cone region: benefit and subsidy systems are not 
really associated with the employment, training and job-seeking support policy 
(Amarante and Bucheli 2006).
The unemployment benefit is a certain rate of the salary received and it is known 
as the unemployment replacement rate (see Table  13.6). This unemployment 
replacement rate tends to decline in all the countries as a means of pressurising the 
unemployed individual to actively start looking for work. In Argentina and Uruguay 
this rate also tends to decrease to encourage active job-seeking. A new aspect in 
Uruguay is that since the 1996 reform there has been a combination between the 
system of contributory and proportional solidarity (managed by Banco de Previsión 
Social, BPS) and another individuals system of capitalisation (managed by 
Administradoras de Fondos de Ahorro de Previsión Social, AFPS) (see Amarante 
and Bucheli 2006; Ferrer and Riddell 2011). One of the problems in Uruguay is that 
the incentive for active job-seeking is weak as a “conditionality” policy. One of the 
essential problems is the tradition of the state to mediate between supply and 
demand in the labour market, an aspect that differentiates these two Latin American 
countries from Spain and Italy.
3 The Latin American model can be characterised more by the sum of unfair dismissal pay than by 
unemployment protection. The conditions of unfair dismissal are a real capitalisation process for 
the worker through the severance pay. However, in recent years unions have demanded the consid-
eration of a more protective unemployment benefit, in view of the wave of dismissals. And, espe-
cially, that perhaps the capitalisation—through severance pay for the worker—is more volatile in 
the context of very high inflation.
4 It is regulated by three laws: The National Employment Law (Law 24.013). The Rural Workers’ 
Law (Law 25.191) and the Construction Industry Law (Law 25.371).
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But the great problem is informal employment, which does not contribute to the 
sustainability of the system. The result is a strong dualization: those who have had 
contributory employment can receive a small unemployment protection. And, infor-
mal workers are completely unprotected, at risk of severe poverty. Although there 
are welfare policies, these can be insufficient in inflationary processes, and they are 
not updated according to said process, like in Argentina from 2016 to 2019.
13.3.2  Unemployment Benefits in Uruguay
Originally in Uruguay the programme covered private workers and excluded domes-
tic and rural workers and workers from the financial sector. From 2001 rural work-
ers were also included (Decree 211/01), although under more restrictive conditions, 
and from 2006 domestic workers were included (Law 18,065). Under the general 
regime and in the case of workers receiving a fixed salary, to access the subsidy, the 
workers must have worked for at least 6 months in the last year and must be invol-
untarily unemployed. In the case of dismissed workers, the new regime replaced the 
flat rate of 50% of the average salary from the last 6 months with a decreasing pay-
ment scheme. Workers with a family to support can receive an additional 20%. The 
rate of workers with unemployment coverage is 27.9% (Cepal 2019). The worker 
cannot use the unemployment benefit again until 12 months have passed since he/
she last received it. Although the benefit can be received for a maximum period of 
6  months (1  year in the case of people aged over 50), the Executive Power can 
extend this period.
It is important to highlight the “suspension” modality in the benefit, also known 
as “reduced work time”. This modality covers those workers whose work hours in a 
company have been reduced or who are part-time employees. In America, only 
Canada, the United States and Uruguay have this benefit. In Latin American it is an 
exclusive feature of the Uruguayan model (ILO 2017).
13.3.3  Welfare Subsidies in Argentina and Uruguay
Welfare subsidies are another means of protection for the long-term unemployed 
who have no more contributory benefits. In Argentina there is also a welfare benefit 
policy, called the Training and Employment Benefit for people in situations of vul-
nerability. There is no requirement to have contributed previously5 (Decree 
336/2006). The benefits can extend to 12 months and count towards future retire-
ment. But the benefit is basic (equivalent to 3.21 Euro monthly in 2019); although it 
5 Reference: Ministry of Employment of Argentina: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/acceder-al- 
seguro-de-capacitacion-y-empleo
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can increase according to the number of dependent children and attendance at train-
ing workshops, reaching 22.86 Euros. This requirement can be considered a condi-
tionality. Another conditionality is attending the employment offices twice a month 
to demonstrate active job-seeking.
Furthermore, there is a system called the Universal Child Allowance, a social 
inclusion programme to avoid severe poverty. An allowance can be granted for up to 
three children and generally informal workers also receive it; the conditionality is 
that they have to take their children to school and have them vaccinated. The allow-
ance is approximately 100 Euros per month according to the number of children.6
In comparative terms Uruguay is the country with most similarities to the 
European social-democratic model in terms of rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
and the social policies system (Cecchini and Martínez 2011), although there are also 
vast social sectors excluded and with low coverage in the contributory social protec-
tion system. The generosity index of the OECD (see Table 13.7 in Appendix) gives 
it a low score (15%).
In short, as regards the first hypothesis, we can summarise that in Argentina and 
Uruguay informal employment hinders the capacity to protect the unemployed. And 
in relation to the second hypothesis, both countries have included the modernising 
discourse of activation.
13.3.4  Unemployment Protection in Spain and Italy
In Spain and Italy unemployment benefit is compulsory, contributory and propor-
tional (see Table 13.6). The sum and period of the benefit has declined and there is 
a policy associated with the training and job-seeking support policy. This policy is 
linked to the follow-up and monitoring of benefits through a system of indicators 
managed by the employment offices, following the guideline of conditionality of the 
benefit defined by the Active Employment Policies of the European Union (H1), 
which cofinances certain assistance programmes through the European Social Fund7 
and the Social Cohesion Fund, among others.
However, the follow-up and monitoring of the conditionality are implemented 
unequally in the administrative regions of the two countries, meaning that to a cer-
tain extent the conditionality is merely a formality in some regions with a very high 
volume of unemployment. The problem is that the application of the principle of 
conditionality requires administrative and professional staff that the employment 
offices do not have. The ILO recommends a ratio of one civil servant to 80 
6 For more information, see: https://www.anses.gob.ar/informacion/montos-de-asignacion- 
universal-por-hijo-y-por-embarazo-para-proteccion-social
7 The total investments from the European Social Fund made between 2014 and 2020 rose in Spain 
and Italy, and was equivalent to 0.59% of the GDP of each country. The highest investments were 
recorded in Hungary (4.10%) and Portugal (3.99%). These investments were dedicated to active 
employment policies, training and welfare subsidies for the long-term unemployed.
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unemployed people to support active job-seeking; however, the ratio in Spain is 
1/607 and in Italy 1/611 (Martín Artiles et al. 2017). As a result, to a certain extent, 
in line with Chebez’ idea (2007) about convergence in the discourse of liquid 
modernity: the meta-accounts of conditionality (H2) have been taken as a univer-
sally applied great theoretical interpretation without taking into account the context 
of each country.
13.3.5  Welfare Subsidies in Spain and Italy
In Spain there is a wide range of transfers for the long-term unemployed who have 
exhausted the contributory benefits, such as the Prodi Programme, Plan Prepara 
2011, the non-contributory job seeker’s allowance, benefits for unemployed people 
aged above 45, returned immigrants aged above 45, and disabled people. In addi-
tion, there is a benefit for people aged above 52, an Agricultural Regime subsidy, 
and lastly—last social protection network—the guaranteed minimum income (RMI) 
of the regions, which oscillates between 300 and 800 Euros depending on the region. 
These welfare benefits increased during the Great European Recession (2007–2015) 
(Martín Artiles et al. 2017). The subsidies have a duration of 6 months, but they tend 
to be extended. The European Union has recommended that Spain reduces the frag-
mentation of the benefits and the regional heterogeneity of the guaranteed minimum 
income (Sarasa 2018; Rodriguez Cabrero 2012). In 2020 has been implemented a 
new national Minimum Income (Ingreso Minimo Vital-BOE n. 165, 12/06/2020-) in 
order to avoid severe poverty, reduce inequalities between regions and the fragmen-
tation of subsidises schemes, as suggested European Union (Rodriguez Cabrero 
2012; Pizzuti 2009; Gualmini and Rizza 2015).
In Italy the system is also very fragmented (Strati 2012; Kazepov and Barberis 
2013), and the benefits are called: Naspi; mini-Naspi; Mobility allowance (Indemnità 
di mobilità); Wage Guarantee Funds (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) and recently 
Citezenship Income (Renta de Citadinanza). Several years ago, in his keynote 
speech at the University of Padua (2009), the then Governor of the Bank of Italy, 
Mario Draghi, defined the Italian system of social security networks as “notoriously 
fragmented”, with a benefit coverage that is “extremely heterogeneous per sector, 
per company size and per work contract”, underscoring how, “to deal with the 
recession, the government’s action was reduced to facing problems not structurally, 
but operating with existing instruments, temporarily extending the coverage and 
allowing exceptions in access criteria and duration”. In both countries the contribu-
tory benefits and subsidies cushion the relative poverty. Despite this, both in Spain 
and Italy, the Third Sector is gaining increasing importance in the protection of the 
unemployed—women, immigrants, people aged above 45, etc.—at risk of social 
exclusion (Rodriguez Cabrero 2005; Ezquerra and Iglesias 2013; Pavolini and 
Raitano 2015).
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13.3.6  Trends in the Reforms of Unemployment Protection
In the second hypothesis (H2) we indicated that the reforms tend to converge in a 
modernising model, inspired by neoliberalism, which follows certain disciplinary 
guidelines based on the idea of activation. An element of political pressure to reform 
unemployment benefits is the high volume of unemployment (Table 13.8). The fol-
lowing table shows how during the Great Recession (2007–2015) unemployment 
increased at an alarming rate in Spain, and in Italy. On the contrary, in Argentina and 
Uruguay it decreased slightly.
13.3.6.1  Common Trends and Differences Between Spain and Italy
The elements characterising the reforms are as follows: (1) A trend towards associ-
ating active and passive policies via “conditionality” clauses; (2) A trend towards 
reforming the fragmented structure of the benefits and subsidies system; (3) 
Exhaustion of the contributory benefits and supplementary payment with subsidies 
(Molina 2015). These elements are analysed below.
One of the common goals in the reforms undertaken in Spain and Italy is to pro-
mote expenditure on active policies and combine it with passive policies (Ferrera 
2013; Coacia and Legini 2013). The case of Denmark is often taken as a reference, 
as it has high expenditure on mediation between supply and demand, with individu-
alised and supervised monitoring of the unemployed; it also has high expenditure on 
training unemployed people, as well as specific groups (Fernández and Serrano 
2014). On the contrary, Spain and Italy spend more on incentives for private employ-
ment, to encourage job-creation in companies. They also spend more on direct job- 
creation in the local sphere. These local initiatives, coordinated by the town councils, 
are aimed at giving support through work and income to those unemployed people 
who have exhausted the contributory unemployment benefit and are receiving grants 
or are about to come to the end of the coverage period (Burroni and Pedaci 2014).
Many unemployed people exhausted the contributory unemployment benefits, 
which became a source of pressure to introduce new non-contributory benefit and 
subsidy systems. Such is the case of Spain during this period, with the approval of 
Table 13.8 Public unemployment spending. In % of GDP
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Spain 1.779 1.740 2.184 3.352 3.003 3.34 3.232 3.116 2.543 2.025 nd
Italy 0.476 0.424 0.49 0.773 0.821 0.796 0.91 1.045 1.017 0.996 nd
France 1.438 1.303 1.251 1.555 1.599 1.506 1.574 1.628 1.626 1.620 nd
Finland 1.742 1.489 1.392 1.884 1.938 1.642 1.724 1.937 2.205 2.369 nd
Chile 0.032 0.03 0.057 0.066 0.104 0.035 0.017 0.052 0.055 0.085 0.02
UK 0.218 0.203 0.287 0.446 0.374 0.394 0.39 0.314 0.214 0.173 nd
In % of GDP
Source: OECD (2019)
Nd no data
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the subsidy programmes Prodi and Prepara in 2011, as well as other subsidies 
reformed during the recession, as we will see below. It also occurred in Italy, with 
the recent approval of the Citenzenship Income (Reddito di Cittadinanza) (2018). 
Many analysts have classified this policy as “welfarist” since it seeks to avoid the 
risk of severe poverty (Kazepov and Barberis 2013; De la Rica 2015).
An examination of the measures implemented in the programmes in the fight 
against unemployment reveals the existence of a certain convergence in the policies in 
Europe, such as (1) the growing importance of local job-creation programmes by the 
public administration; (2) the promotion of training and professional upskilling pro-
grammes, and (3) advice for unemployed people through incentives and sanctions and 
the growing trend in the EU towards a supranational coordination through the 
European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion 
Fund, among others. This all appears to conclude in a trend towards the introduction 
of common patterns in European policies against unemployment. This shared pattern 
of convergence in the elements mentioned is a demonstration of the “vertical coordi-
nation” of the spill-over effect of the European Union policy (Scharpf 2000).
But despite the convergence, Spain and Italy have a problem in common: a very 
fragmented unemployment protection and subsidies system, criticised by the rec-
ommendations from the European Union, which insists on streamlining the men-
tioned systems. Italy recently started (2018) a system unification policy through the 
Guaranteed Minimum Income (Tridico 2015; Baldini and Gori 2019). Also in Spain 
has been implemented in 2020 the Ingreso Minimo Vital with the same purpose.8
13.3.6.2  Common Features of the Reform Trends in Argentina 
and Uruguay
Unemployment protection in these two countries shows three main characteristics: (1) 
varied instruments, often superimposed and with little relation between them, and (2) 
a partial efficacy to guarantee benefits that make up for salary loss and that support the 
reincorporation of the unemployed person into the workplace. (3) The protection is 
incomplete as it does not always guarantee that an unemployed person will have mon-
etary assistance (severance pay comes into effect in specific circumstances). Or when 
they are entitled to it, there is no guarantee that the resources will be sufficient to 
finance the duration of the unemployment (individual savings accounts).
The discourse on the modernisation of the protection systems is also present in 
the policies of Argentina and Uruguay, although formally. An indicator of this is that 
the effectiveness of the unemployment protection can be strengthened through a 
combination of passive and active labour market policies. The formal objective of 
the discourse seeks to move from passive regimes, exclusively oriented towards 
8 Data from the National Institute of Social Insurance (INPS) show that 1.3 million Italians receive 
an average subsidy of 519 Euros. These are essentially long-term unemployed people from the 
south of Italy (55%). The payment of the income is individual, but through family implications it 
adds up to more than two million people who are receiving UGL (General Labour Union) Survey 
of Public Employment Services in Italy and Europe (2018).
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replacing income for unemployed people, to a combination of these with measures 
that support its beneficiaries in the search for a new job or that improve their employ-
ability through job training. In other words, a discourse with modernisation argu-
ments similar to those used in Spain and Italy, as we suggested in hypothesis 2.
13.4  Conclusions
 1. In general terms we distinguished four models of unemployment protection: (1) 
Liberal and Latin-American countries; (2) Bismarkian model in Germanic Area; 
(3) Scandinavian neocorporatist model and Southern Bismarkian countries; (4) 
Eastern countries.
 2. As regards the first hypothesis, we have demonstrated that the unemployment 
benefit systems operate differently in the European and Latin American con-
texts, despite both formally having contributory-proportional systems. We can 
conclude that effectively there are certain similarities in Spain, Italy, Argentina 
and Uruguay in certain aspects of the institutional design, such as the fact that 
the benefit system is compulsory, contributory-proportional and the ultimate 
responsibility of the state to save the system through the financing of deficits. 
But we must immediately mention the strong differences depending on the con-
text. We can even discuss contributory “fiscal indiscipline” in Argentina and 
Uruguay. While in Spain and Italy the business contribution is much higher, 
monitored by the Labour Inspection and disciplined.
The unemployment coverage level presents very low rates in Argentina and 
Uruguay, due to the high volume of informal employment and the low institu-
tionalisation of the system,—let us remembers that the institutionalisation of 
unemployment benefit should be a powerful institution to correct inequalities—. 
While in Spain and Italy the coverage is comparatively high, because those who 
have exhausted the contributory benefits also receive income subsidies. The 
degree of informal employment is comparatively less in Spain and Italy. In these 
two countries the benefits and subsidies system is fragmented. Hence, the 
European Union is calling for the different types of benefits to be streamlined.
Likewise, there are differences between Spain and Italy as there also are between 
Argentina and Uruguay. In Spain, the generosity index is wider, although Italy 
has just implemented the Citezenship Income (Renta de Citadinanza), which 
could contribute towards improving it and towards reducing the territorial north- 
south inequalities. Also Spain has just implement in 2020 other national 
Minimum Income in order to reduce inequalities and harmonise territorial differ-
ences in the context of covit’s pandemia and strong pression of Trade Unions.
 3. As regards our second hypothesis, we conclude that unemployment benefits are 
ballasted. The weight of long-term unemployment, as well as temporary and 
precarious employment, has been hanging over Spain and Italy for years. This 
entails a lack of continuity in the contribution and low financial contributions to 
the social security. The response to these problems has consisted of the promo-
tion of active employment policies associated with the unemployment benefit or 
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subsidy. Said response is part of the European Union active employment policy, 
which has financing instruments (European Social Funds), which can act as dis-
ciplinary rules for those countries that breach the regulations.
However, the activation discourse has a certain air of formal modernity. But in 
practice, some of its postulates are relatively discursive and empty, such as that 
of “conditionality, activation, job-seeking support, employability and continu-
ous lifelong learning”. Only certain regions with low unemployment can imple-
ment said policies in Italy and Spain. In some regions the employment offices 
are unable to implement the discourse because they lack resources and staff.
Paradoxically, this modernising activation discourse has also transferred to 
Argentina and Uruguay. However, it is limited by the informal employment 
problem, the black economy, the weakness of its tax base and the weak institu-
tionalisation of the unemployment benefits. In the case of Argentina, perhaps the 
challenge today will be for the existing benefits to institutionalise, consolidate 
and extend their coverage in the context of the Argentinian economic recession 
and its extremely high inflation rate. However, the debate on unemployment 
benefits has emerged again in Argentina and Uruguay as a result of the increase 
in unemployment and the dismissals in the formal private sector.
In short, certain modernising theories have taken root in the discourse of the 
reform policies, such as the Active Welfare State, the Investor State and a series 
of concepts that are incoherent with the context of the four countries. But said 
liberal discourse seeks to introduce social discipline mechanisms though the 
principle of activation, responsibility and placing the blame on the individual as 
regards unemployment and poverty risk. The state, the community and the social 
structure are no longer responsible, it would appear.
 4. To conclude, the four countries share some similarities in their trends, such as: 
(1) the increase in welfare policies; (2) the growth of the Third Sector to tackle 
inequalities and poverty risk, in view of the state’s “withdrawal”: in Italy and 
Spain because long-term unemployment has increased and as a result of the 
precariousness of new jobs. In Uruguay and Argentina as a result of the high 
volume of informal employment and the low salaries; (3) likewise, in the four 
countries, the high volume of public debt restricts the possibilities of political 
manoeuvre; (4) the responsibility of job-creation lies on the market, not on pub-
lic intervention because the states are indebted; (5) another similarity is the 
implementation of a discourse aimed at the association of passive and active 
policies, even with a certain degree of conditionality for unemployed people so 
they can receive benefits although said discourse is still merely a formality, and 
is far from a reality. Lastly, (6) another common feature is the emphasis on 
 pre- distributive policies, focused on development in the labour market, where 
the idea that the first distributive social policy must be employment is emphasised.
As a final note, it is important to point out a final difference between Europe and 
Latin America: despite the reforms of the unemployment protection systems, in 
Europe the bureaucracy and fiscal system has a considerable capacity to monitor 
and sanction. In addition, there are strong trade unions that have contributed towards 
the pressure to sustain the welfare state.
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 Appendix
Table 13.3 Public deficit or surplus (In % of GDP)
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Italy −3.6 −1.3 −2.6 −5.1 −4.2 −3.6 −2.9 −2.9 −3.00 −2.6 −2.4 −2.4 −2.2
Spain 2.12 1.89 −4.57 −11.28 −9.53 −9.74 −10.74 −7.04 −5.92 −5.18 −4.31 −3.02 −2.54
Argentina 1.65 0.76 0.35 −1.83 1.39 −2.75 −3.02 −2.37 −1.88 −4.25 −6.00 −6.7 −5.22
Uruguay −0.7 −0.17 −1.42 −1.52 −0.42 −0.36 −2.37 −1.88 −2.84 −2.22 −3.1 −2.7 −2.02
Source: Cepal (2019) and Eurostat (2019)
Table 13.2 Public debt in % of GDP
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Spain 38.9 35.6 39.5 52.8 60.1 69.5 85.7 95.5 100.4 99.4 99.0 98.3 97.6
Italy 102.6 99.8 102.4 112.5 115.4 116.5 123.4 129 131.8 131.5 132.0 131.8 132.2
Argentina 70.8 62.1 53.8 55.4 43.5 38.9 40.4 43.5 44.7 52.6 53.1 57.1 86.3
Uruguay 75.7 68.0 59.8 63.1 59.4 58.1 58.0 60.4 61.4 64.6 61.6 65.7 70.0
Source: Cepal (2019) and Eurostat (2019)
Table 13.7 Generosity index
Countries First year %
Average substitutions of income over a period of 5 years 
(tax benefit and welfare subsidies) %
Noway 72 72
Belgium 65 63
Germany 64 45
Francie 67 45
Finland 60 43
Spain 69 39
United 
Kingdom
28 28
Argentina 50 22.6
Uruguay 50 15
Brazil 50 15.1
Chile 50 4
Italy 75 7a
Sources: For European countries OECD (2007), from Latin America Chebez (2007)
The OECD generosity index (2007), calculated for a period of 5 years, provides us with an idea of 
the role played by contributory benefits and welfare subsidies for the unemployed. The following 
table provides us with a brief overview of the countries analysed, as well as of other countries
aThis indicator has recently changed with Cittadinanza Income
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